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ABSTRACT
Optimal tax theory has shown that, under weak assumptions, indirect taxation such as production
subsidies, tariffs, or differentiated commodity taxation, are sub-optimal and that redistribution should be
achieved solely with the direct income tax. However, these important results of optimal tax theory,
namely production efficiency and uniform commodity taxation under non-linear income taxation, have
been shown to break down when labor taxation is based on income only and when there is imperfect
substitution of labor types in the production function. These results in favor of indirect tax instruments
are valid in the short-run when skills are exogenous and individuals cannot move from occupation to
occupation. In the long-run, it is more realistic to assume that individuals choose their occupation based
on the relative after-tax rewards. This paper shows that, in that context, production efficiency and the
uniform commodity tax result are restored. Therefore, in a long-run context, direct income taxation should








The theory of optimal taxation has derived a number of powerful properties of optimal tax
structures. First and perhaps most important is the production eciency result of Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971). This result states that the economy should be on its production frontier
at the optimum when the government can tax (linearly) all factors (inputs and outputs) at
dierent rates and when there are no pure prots (or when pure prots can be fully taxed).
This result has two very important public policy implications. First, the public sector should
optimize its production decisions using market prices. Second, the government should not use
taris, production taxes or subsidies because they create production ineciencies.
Second, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) showed that there is no need to use commodity taxation
when the government can use a non-linear income tax and utility functions are weakly separable
between goods and leisure. Atkinson and Stiglitz proved their theorem using a xed priced
model with perfect substitution between dierent types of labor. This result has been applied
in many instances and has notably been used to show that, under plausible assumptions, capital
taxation is not necessary when labor income can be taxed non-linearly.
These two results combined have a very strong and simple tax policy implication. Indirect
tax instruments such as production subsidies, taris, or dierentiated commodity taxation, are
sub-optimal and redistribution should be achieved solely with the direct income tax.
Third, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) showed another important result for the theoretical
analysis of optimal tax structures, namely that optimal tax formulas are identical when prices
of factors are xed, as in a small open economy, and when prices are variable and derived from
a general production function. This result is important because it implies that substitution
between inputs in the production function can be ignored when deriving optimal tax formulas.
This simplies considerably the analysis. From now on, we call this result the Tax-Formula
result.1
However, these three important results of optimal tax theory have been challenged by sub-
sequent studies. Stiglitz (1982) has developed a simple two-type model (skilled and unskilled
workers), where the government cannot observe workers' skills and has to base taxation on in-
1This result has received much less attention in the literature than the previous two results because it does
not have such important practical tax policy implications.
2come only. In that situation, the government cannot impose freely dierentiated tax rates on
each type of labor as in the Diamond-Mirrlees model and the Tax-Formula result breaks down.
In the model of Stiglitz (1982), there is imperfect substitution of labor types in the production
function and the optimal tax formulas depend explicitly on the elasticity of substitution be-
tween skilled and unskilled labor. Stiglitz (1982) point is important because it shows that the
standard properties of the optimal non-linear income tax model of Mirrlees (1971), such as the
zero top result or the positivity of the marginal tax rate, obtained under the assumption perfect
substitution between labor types are not robust to the relaxation of this assumption.
Recently, Naito (1999) has shown that, in the framework of the Stiglitz (1982) model where
there is imperfect substitution of labor types in the production function and the government
has to base taxation on income only, the production eciency result of Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971) and the theorem of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) on commodity taxation also break
down. The production eciency result breaks down because the government cannot apply
dierentiated rates on each type of labor and thus the taxation power of the government is
restricted compared to the Diamond-Mirrlees model.2 The Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem breaks
down because of imperfect substitution in labor types. In that case, manipulating indirectly
wages through commodity taxation enhances the redistributive power of the income tax and is
thus desirable.
Therefore, relaxing two assumptions in a natural way is enough to loose the three main results
of optimal taxation theory. The rst of these two assumptions is perfect substitution of labor
inputs in the production function. The second assumption is the possibility to condition wage
income tax rates on labor type. From now on, this second assumption is called the labor types
observability assumption. Both the Tax-Formula result and the production eciency result of
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) are valid with imperfect substitution of labor types but no longer
when the labor types observability assumption is relaxed. The Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem is
valid without labor types observability but not when the perfect substitution of labor types
assumption is relaxed. Naito's (1999) contribution is important, not only because it shows that
the key results of optimal tax theory are not robust to the relaxation of two assumptions that
2Guesnerie (1998) provides an analysis close to Naito (1999) along those lines.
3clearly do not hold in the real situation,3 but mostly because it gives a clear sense of how the
indirect tax instruments should be used to complement income taxation. When the government
cares about redistribution, taris on low skill labor intensive goods, production subsidies for low
skilled intensive goods, or commodity taxes on high skill labor intensive goods, are desirable.
Therefore, indirect taxation should supplement income taxation in the direction one would
expect, and thus Naito's results provide a convincing rationale for using a variety of indirect tax
instruments.
The present paper argues that the negative results of Stiglitz (1982) and Naito (1999) hinge
crucially on the way labor supply behavioral responses are modeled. In both of these papers,
workers are intrinsically either skilled or unskilled and respond to incentives by varying their
hours of work. In that case, manipulating indirectly wages through taris, production subsidies
or commodity taxation enhances redistribution because these indirect instruments help overcome
the informational constraints that arise with the use of the income tax. This model might be
an accurate description of labor responses in the short run once individuals have chosen their
education decisions and type of jobs.
However, in the long-run, when relative wages between occupations change, the adjustment
does not go through changes in individual hours of work but rather through changes in relative
entry levels by occupation. For example, if an industry becomes obsolete because of technological
progress, then the wages in that particular industry decline and supply for this type of occupation
dwindles. The adjustment of hours or work at the individual level is in this case of second order
of importance in the long run. Therefore, in the long run, it seems more natural to assume that
individuals choose their job depending on the (after-tax) rewards that each type of job is giving.
Even in the medium run, individuals may react to taxation through occupational changes or
intensity of work to climb up the career ladder rather than keeping the same occupation and
varying only the amount of work.
This paper shows that, in the context of a job choice model, the three results of optimal
taxation, namely the Tax-Formula result, Production Eciency, and the Atkinson-Stiglitz Theo-
rem, remain valid when both the perfect substitution of labor types and wage type observability
3Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) were aware that the assumption that the government could tax each input or
output at specic rates was critical for their result.
4assumptions are relaxed. Intuitively, in the long run or occupational choice model, as hours of
work are xed, income is directly proportional to the wage rate and therefore, the income tax is
equivalent to a direct tax on wages and thus indirect taxation through taris, production subsi-
dies or commodity taxation becomes useless. As we will discuss, the short-run or hours of work
model and the long-run or occupational model can be distinguished empirically. Therefore, it
should be possible to assess precisely to what extent the objections of Stiglitz (1982) and Naito
(1999) to the normal theory are relevant. The result of the present paper has important policy
implications because it shows that, although taris or production subsidies might be socially
desirable in the short-run, they cannot be optimal in a long-run context. Therefore, governments
with a suciently low discount rate should not support these policies. Though intuitively rea-
sonable, the result is not obvious and depends in a precise way on how the behavioral responses
to taxation are modeled. This set of results ts well with the actual political debate. Unions
and populist parties which represent the interests of current blue collar workers tend to support
indirect tax instruments such as taris or production subsidies while political parties or asso-
ciations which represent a broader set of the population tend to prefer direct tax instruments
such as the income tax or the value added tax to raise revenue and achieve redistribution.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple example to contrast the desir-
ability of taris in the short-run and in the long-run. Section 3 presents the job choice model in
a general way and shows that this model can be seen as a direct extension of the Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971) economy, and shows why the three main results of optimal taxation are valid in
that context. Finally, Section 4 oers some concluding remarks.
2 A Simple Example
This section shows in a very simplied context why taris are desirable in the short run but no
longer in the long run. I rst present the structure of the economy common to both situations.
There are two types of occupation in the economy. A low skill occupation produces a low
technology good (for example textile) and a high skill occupation produces a high technology
good (for example computers). In each sector, one unit of high (low) skilled labor produces one
unit of high (low) technology good. Subscript 1 denotes the low technology good or sector and
5subscript 2 the high technology good or sector. We consider the case of a small open economy
which takes as given the international prices of each good p = (p1;p2). The small country can
impose a tari t per unit on imports of good 1. Therefore the domestic prices of goods are
q = (q1;q2) = (p1 +t;p2). We assume that the production sectors are competitive and therefore
wages rates w = (w1;w2) in each sector are equal to domestic prices q = (q1;q2). We assume that
utility is separable between consumption of goods 1 and 2, and labor choices. All individuals
derive the same utility U(c1;c2) for consuming goods 1 and 2 in quantity c1 and c2. The indirect
utility is v(q;x) = max U(c1;c2) subject to q1c1 + q2c2  x, where x denotes after tax income.
The government sets an optimal (non-linear) income tax that can be based only of total labor
earnings.
As the goal of this section is to contrast the desirability of taris in the short-run versus the
long-run, we consider two models for labor choices. The rst model is a short-run or choice of
hours model and the second model is a long-run or occupation choice model. In the short-run,
individuals are stuck into an occupation (high skill or low skill) but can vary their labor supply
(hours of work) on the job. This is classic discrete type model of optimal taxation developed by
Stiglitz (1982). In the long run however, individuals choose their occupation according to the
relative rewards in each occupation. As we think that the hours choice is of second order in the
long run, we assume labor supply is xed and equal to one once a type of job is chosen in the
occupational choice model. This occupational model was developed by Piketty (1997) to study
optimal income tax issues.
2.1 The short-run or choice of hours model
This model is a simplied version of the model of Naito (1996). The simplied model we use has
been developed by Spector (1999) to investigate under which circumstances opening an economy
to free trade improves welfare. Therefore, the model is presented quickly and only the intuitions
for the results are given.
Individuals are either unskilled (type 1) or skilled (type 2). I denote by f the immutable
proportion of unskilled workers. Individuals choose their hours of work l, earn wil and pay taxes
Ti according to their type i. Total utility is equal to Vi = v(q;wil   Ti)   C(l) where C(l) is
an increasing and convex function of labor cost. Because, the government cannot observe types
6directly, the income tax (T1;T2) must be incentive compatible: skilled workers must be better
o working l2 and earning w2l2   T2 after taxes rather than imitating the unskilled by working
w1l1=w2 and earning w1l1   T1. As is standard in the literature, we assume that we are in the
normal redistributive case where only this incentive compatibility constraint is binding.
For a given level of taris t, the government chooses (l1;l2;T1;T2) so as to maximize a
weighted sum of utilities, W = 1fV1 + 2(1   f)V2 (where i are positive weights), subject to
the incentive compatibility constraint
v(q;w2l2   T2)   C(l2)  v(q;w1l1   T1)   C(w1l1=w2); (1)
and a budget constraint stating that total tax collected are at least equal to zero.4 I denote by
C1 total consumption of good 1 in the economy. As fl1 is total production of good 1 in the
economy, net imports are equal to C1   fl1. Therefore, net taxes collected by the tari t are
equal to t(C1   fl1) and the budget constraint of the government is
fT1 + (1   f)T2 + t(C1   fl1)  0: (2)
At the optimum, the incentive compatibility condition (1) is binding. As usual, labor supply
of the high skilled is ecient (C0(l2) = w2) but labor supply of the unskilled is below the ecient
level (C0(l1) < w1). Naito (1996) showed that starting from a situation with no taris t = 0,
imposing a small tari dt > 0 increases welfare W. An intuitive explanation for this result can
be presented as follows.5
Suppose that the government increases taris by dt, then the government collects (C1 fl1)dt
additional taxes. The tari can be decomposed into two eects. First, the small tari increases
the price of good 1 by dt as would a consumption tax dt on good 1. Second, the tari increases
the wages of the unskilled by dt. Therefore, the tari is exactly equivalent to a consumption
tax dt on good one plus a wage subsidy dt for the unskilled.6 The consumption tax part has
no rst order eect on welfare because of the separability assumption between goods and labor
4Assuming that a given exogenous amount a tax revenue should be collected would not change the analysis.
5Naito's derives his result from the formal analysis of the rst order conditions.
6This decomposition has been introduced by Dixit and Norman (1980, 1986).
7costs. This result is a particular case of the general result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976).7
Therefore, to assess the welfare eect of the tari, we simply have to assess the welfare eect
of the wage subsidy dt on low skill workers. It is useful to compare the wage subsidy with an
income tax cut for the low skilled dT1 =  l1dt. As we start from an optimal income tax, this
income tax change has no rst order eect on welfare. Let us show why the wage subsidy is
superior to the income tax change and hence has a positive rst order eect on welfare.
The wage subsidy has the same eect on both the utility of the unskilled and the same
mechanical eect on tax revenue (ignoring behavioral responses) as the income tax change. Let
us see why the wage subsidy does better on incentives than the income tax cut. Equation (1)
shows that the high skilled person mimicking the low skilled does not benet from the low skill
wage subsidy because the high skill wage w2 is not aected by the subsidy. Intuitively, the wage
subsidy allows to target redistribution to the low skilled without aecting the incentives of the
high skilled because when a high skilled reduces labor supply to imitate a low skilled person, he
remains in the high skilled sector and thus does not benet from the wage subsidy. On the other
hand, equation (1) shows that the high skill mimicking the low skill benets from the income
tax cut dT1. Therefore, a modication of the income tax in favor of the low skilled is going to
aect labor supply of the high skilled as well because the tax schedule is common to both types.
Therefore, it is clear that, for incentive reasons, the wage subsidy is preferable to the income
tax cut.8
2.2 The long-run or occupational choice model
In the long-run model, individuals choose their occupation according to the relative rewards in
each occupation. As it is plausible that the hours choice is of second order in the long run,
7In short, the government can replicate the commodity tax dt on good 1 using a small income tax change dT




1 denotes consumption of good 1 by type i. Because of the separability assumption,
the incentive compatibility constraint remains satised. As the income tax is optimal, this change (and hence the
small commodity tax) has no rst order eect on welfare.
8This can be shown formally using Lagrangian analysis. The rst order eect on the Lagrangian of introducing
a wage subsidy dt is equal to the rst order eect of introducing dT1 =  l1dt (which is zero at the optimum)
plus an extra term C
0(w1l1=w2) > 0 ( is the multiplier of the constraint (1)) showing that a wage subsidy is
desirable.
8we assume labor supply is xed (at unity) once a type of job is chosen. Therefore a given
individual decides whether to work in an unskilled occupation or a skilled occupation depending
on the after-tax incomes w1   T1 and w2   T2 in each occupation. Individuals dier in their
tastes for work in each occupation. It may be easier for example for more educated people to
handle a skilled occupation that for less educated people. We assume that the tastes for work
are smoothly distributed across individuals and that the population is large enough so that the
proportion of individuals who choose to work in a each occupation is a continuous function
of after-tax incomes wi   Ti.9. We assume therefore that the total population is a continuum
normalized to one and that the number of people in the low skilled job depends continuously on
w1   T1, w2   T2, and the price level q. We denote by f = f(w1   T1;w2   T2;q) the fraction
of individuals who choose the low skilled occupation. Behavioral responses are built into the
function f(w1   T1;w2   T2;q). Presumably, f is increasing in w1   T1 because if after-tax
income in the low skilled occupation increases while prices and after-tax income in the high
skilled occupation remain constant, low skilled occupations become more attractive and some
high skilled workers may switch to low skilled occupations. Similarly, f is presumably decreasing
in w2   T2.
The government sets an income tax (T1;T2) so as to maximize a weighted sum of utilities
subject a budget constraint. We assume that the government also imposes a tari t on good 1.
Production of good 1 is equal to the number f of workers in the low skilled occupation. Total
consumption of good 1 is denoted as above by C1 and thus net imports are equal to C1 f. Thus,
the budget constraint of the government is fT1 + (1   f)T2 + t(C1   f)  0. We assume that
the government maximizes a social welfare function W which is a weighted sum of individual
utilities subject to the budget constraint.
As before, starting from a situation with no taris, we want to know whether imposing a
tari can improve welfare. As shown above, imposing a tari dt is equivalent to imposing a
commodity tax dt on good one and a wage subsidy dt on low skilled jobs. As in the hours choice
model, the small commodity tax has no rst order eect on welfare because of separability
between consumption and labor choices.
In the present model, workers base their decision on after-tax incomes wi Ti. Thus increasing
9This issue is treated rigorously in Section 3
9the pre-tax wage w1 by dt dollars is strictly equivalent to decreasing the income tax T1 by dt
dollars from the workers' perspective. Obviously, the scal cost for the government of a wage
subsidy dt on low skilled workers is equal to a reduction dT1 =  dt of the income tax on low
skilled workers. Therefore, the wage subsidy dt is exactly equivalent to a reduction in the income
tax dT1 =  dt. Consequently, the small tari can be exactly replicated using the income tax
instrument. As the income tax is optimal, a small change around the optimum cannot improve
welfare. As a result, the small tari dt does not improve welfare either, implying that there
should be no tari at the optimum.
2.3 Interpretation
The desirability of taris hinges crucially on whether taris constitute a new tax instrument
that cannot be replicated with the domestic income or commodity taxes. In the simple model
we have considered, imposing a tari on low skilled intensive goods amounts to imposing a wage
subsidy to low skilled occupations which narrows the wage gap between the two types of jobs.
In the short-run model, individuals are stuck in their low or high skill occupation and can only
vary hours of work within their occupation. Therefore, a wage subsidy specic to the low skilled
has no adverse eect on the incentives to work of the high skilled. In contrast, an income tax
cut for the low incomes would make it more attractive for the high skilled to mimic the low
skilled and take advantage of the tax cut. Therefore, in the short-run model, taris enhance the
redistributive power of the government, and are therefore desirable. In the long run, however,
reducing the gap between high and low wage earners with a low skilled wage subsidy will induce
high skilled workers to move to less skilled occupations, and thus, the wage subsidy is directly
equivalent to a reduction in the income tax burden of the low skilled. Therefore, taris or direct
wage subsidies can be replicated by the income tax instrument and thus are useless instruments
in a long-run context with optimal income taxation.
The short-run model predicts that a low skilled wage subsidy would have no eect on labor
supply of the high skilled whereas the long-run model predicts that such a wage subsidy would
have exactly the same eect as a cut in the income tax for low incomes. Therefore, in order to
assess which of the two models is the closest to the real situation, the critical empirical question
is whether a wage subsidy to the low skilled would indeed have a smaller eect on incentives
10of the high skilled than an equivalent cut in the income tax at the low end. Unfortunately, the
empirical literature on the labor supply responses to taxation does not oer a direct answer to
this question but some elements should be noted.
Labor supply studies nd little cross-sectional relation between hours of work and the wage
rate, suggesting that narrowly dened hours of work are not very sensitive to the wage rate
(see the surveys by Pencavel (1986) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)). However, one should
not interpret the Stiglitz (1982) model too narrowly. When the income tax increases, the high
skilled might respond by reducing eort on the job producing a signicant decrease in earnings
but with little change in hours of work. It is important therefore to look at overall earnings and
not only hours of work.
Studies focusing on overall income or earnings tend indeed to nd larger elasticities than
hours of work studies (see e.g., Feldstein (1995) for a seminal study of the response of taxable
income to tax rates and Gruber and Saez (2000) for a recent survey of this literature). By itself,
this piece of evidence is not conclusive for our problem because this type of response could be
compatible both with the short-run model and the long-run model. It ts with the short-run
model if, as mentioned just above, individuals vary their intensity of work on the job in response
to taxation. It ts with the long-run model if individuals vary their labor supply in order to
get into dierent occupations, either by getting promoted more quickly or more slowly within
a rm, or by moving to other sectors. The empirical literature does not give much information
on this issue.
Related to this point however, a strand of the labor supply literature focuses on the response
along the extensive margin, namely dropping out or entering the labor force. This margin has
been shown to be sensitive to the net-of-tax wage rate, especially for secondary earners (see e.g.,
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001)). This suggests that the response along the occupation margin
might be more important than the response along the intensity of work on the job, at least for
low skilled workers.
Last, following the path-breaking modeling work of Becker (1964), there has been substantial
eort devoted to the estimation of the response of education and human capital accumulation
choices to the salaries and rewards in dierent occupations (see e.g., the survey of Freeman
(1986)). The literature nds evidence of substantial elasticities of the supply of education
11with respect to salaries, suggesting that the long-run occupational choice responses are large.
Therefore, it is reasonable to think that the response of education to changes in the degree of
the progressivity of taxation is also signicant and plausibly large.10 Consequently, ignoring this
response completely as in the Stiglitz (1982) model is not realistic.
The remaining of the paper considers a generalization of the model of occupational choice
developed in Section 2.2 and shows that, contrary to the hours choice model sketched in Section
2.1, the important properties of optimal tax structures, namely production eciency, the Tax-
formula result and the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem remain true.
3 A General Model of Occupational Choice
In this section, we present a general model of occupational choice with many commodities and a
general production function. The core of the argument is to note that this model is a generalized
version of the economy analyzed by the seminal paper of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). As a
result, we will show that this occupational model inherits the key properties of the Diamond-
Mirrlees model, namely production eciency, the Tax Formula result, and that Atkinson-Stiglitz
theorem also carries over to that model.
3.1 The Model
In the model, each individual chooses an occupation or job i among a set of I + 1 possible
occupations f0;1;::;Ig. We assume that job 0 is non participation in the labor force. Once a
job is chosen, hours of work are xed at unity. In other words, the only margin of decision for
individuals is the occupation margin and the hours of work margin is inelastic. As discussed in
Section 2, this captures a long-run model of labor supply or skill acquisition decision and is a
good representation of the real world if the long-run labor supply responses through educational
and occupational choices dwarf the short-run labor supply responses through hours of work or
intensity of work within a given occupation. The key assumption is that dierent jobs do not
pay the same wage: wi 6= wj for any i 6= j. This assumption is almost surely satised as
10Unfortunately, there appears to be no convincing study of the direct eect of income taxation of the supply
of education and occupations.
12we posited a nite number of occupations. Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that
w0 = 0 < w1 < :: < wI. The government sets taxes as a function of income Ti = T(wi). I denote
by mi = wi   Ti after-tax income in job i. Because wages are dierent in each occupation,
imposing the income tax amounts to imposing dierentiated tax rates on the supply of each
occupation. I come back in detail to this important point at the end of the Section.
As in the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) model, in addition to these I labor inputs to produc-
tion, we assume that there are K consumption goods. We denote by c the vector on consumption
for a given individual and by  p and  q the before and after-tax prices of consumption goods. As
in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), there is a general production function dening the production
possibility set linking the K consumption goods and the I labor inputs. As is standard, I assume
that the production function has constant returns to scale or that the government can fully tax
pure prots.
We assume that there is continuum of individuals of measure one, and that each individual
is indexed by n belonging to a general index set N possibly multi-dimensional. Individual n
maximizes a utility function un(c;i) which depends on the vector of consumption goods c and
on the job i chosen subject to the budget constraint  q  c  mi. The individual characteristic n
embodies both tastes for work and skills. For example, a hard working or skilled individual will
nd it easier to choose a more demanding or highly skilled occupation.
In order to see the link between the present model and the standard Diamond-Mirrlees econ-
omy, it is useful to treat symmetrically the consumption decision and the job choice. Therefore, I
denote by m = (m0;m1;::;mI) the vector of after-tax incomes, and by p = ( p;w) and q = ( q;m)
the before and after-tax price vector of goods and wages, and by  = (t; T) = q  p the vector
of tax rates. I denote by cn the individual consumption choice vector. Similarly, the job choice i
of individual n can be denoted as dn =  (0;::;0;1;0;::;0) where dn is a vector of size I +1 and
the unique 1 in vector dn is the (i + 1)-th element. Therefore, I can summarize total demand
of individual n by the K + I + 1 vector xn = (cn;dn). Individual n picks xn so as to maximize
u(xn) subject to q  xn  0. Let us denote by xn(q) the individual (net) demand vector, and by
V n(q) the indirect utility function arising from this maximization program. Put in that form,
this model looks identical to a Diamond-Mirrlees economy. The unique and key dierence is
that the job choice dn belongs to a discrete set (as we assume that individuals cannot choose a
13convex combination of occupations). As a result, the individual demand xn(q) is discontinuous
at points q where the individual is indierent between two occupations.11 However, as we will
see, this discontinuity at the individual level is going to be smoothed out at the aggregate level
under some simple conditions.





where (n) denotes the distribution of individuals over N. We denote by C(q) the vector of aggre-
gate demand for consumption goods and fi(q) the fraction of individuals who choose occupation
i when facing prices q. It is important to note that the behavioral responses to income taxation
are fully embodied in the aggregate supply functions fi(q). For example, when mi declines,
individuals may move out of occupation i producing a decrease in fi and corresponding increase
in the supply of other close occupations. By denition, X(q) = (C(q); f0(q);::; fI(q)). The
government sets taxes  so as to maximize a weighted sum of individual utilities. The social





where (n) is a measure of non-negative weights. Exactly as in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971),
the government maximizes the social welfare function V (q) subject to a budget constraint and
a production constraint. The budget constraint states that total tax collected   X(q) must be
larger that some exogenous amount E. The production constraint states that aggregate demand
X(q) must be technically feasible. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) show that it is mathematically
equivalent to assume that the government has full control of the production decision. Therefore,
the two constraints can be collapsed into a single constraint X(q) 2 G where G is the production
set. The production set G embodies both the revenue requirement E and the technological
feasibility constraint.
11Note that the indirect utility V
n(q) is continuous as soon as we assume that u
n(:) is continuous.
143.2 Properties of the Occupational Model
 Production Eciency
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) show that, when aggregate demand X(q) and the indirect social
welfare function V (q) are continuous in q (THEOREM 4, p.23), at the optimum q, aggregate
demand X(q) is on the frontier of the set G. This is the Production eciency theorem. In
the Diamond-Mirrlees economy, continuity follows directly from convexity of preferences. In
the occupational model of the present paper, continuity of aggregate demand is obtained by
assuming that the number of individual is large and preferences regularly distributed. More
precisely
Assumption 1 For each individual n, preferences are strictly convex and regular enough so
that individual the demand function xn(q) is regular at any point q where individual n is not
indierent between two or more job choices.
For any q >> 0, the set Aq of individuals n who are indierent between two or more job
choices is of measure zero.
By regular, we mean continuous and dierentiable. As discussed above, individual demand is
obviously discontinuous at price levels q where the individual switches between occupations (and
hence is indierent between two or more occupations). The rst part of assumption 1 simply
states that, outside these singular points, demand functions are well behaved and regular. The
second part of assumption 1 states that these singular points are smoothly distributed across
individuals precisely so that there are no jumps in the aggregate.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, aggregate demand X(q) and indirect social welfare V (q) are
regular in q.
The technical proof is presented in appendix. Using Lemma 1 and the same proof as in
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), we obtain immediately
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, at the optimum, there should be production eciency in
the occupational choice model.
15 Tax-Formula and Optimal Income Taxation
From the maximization program described above, max V (q) subject to X(q) 2 G, Diamond










where  is a positive multiplier and Xj is aggregate demand of good (or factor) j. The important
property embodied in equation (5) and that I called the Tax-Formula result in the introduction
section is that the rst order condition (5) does not depend explicitly upon the degree of substi-
tution between factors in the production function. Put dierently, in the derivation of equation
(5), one can assume that producer prices pj are constant. Of course, in any practical applica-
tion with endogenous prices, the prices pj at the optimum depend indirectly on the demand for
goods and factors and thus on the vector of taxes . However, the Tax-Formula result simplies
considerably the theoretical analysis of equation (5).
In the present occupational model, the tax formula result is going to be valid as soon as the
functions V (q) and X(q) are dierentiable in q. Therefore
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, at the optimum, the tax formula (5) applies in the occu-
pational choice model.
The Tax-Formula result of Proposition 2 is important for optimal income taxation. The
occupational model with one consumption good and multiple job choices can be seen as a
model of optimal non-linear taxation. The government chooses tax rates on each occupation to
maximize welfare taking into account the potentially adverse eect of taxation on incentives to
work. This model was rst developed by Piketty (1997) in the case of three occupations and a
Rawlsian welfare criterion and extended by Saez (2000a) to any number of occupations and any
social welfare function to study the problem of optimal transfers to low incomes.
The literature on non-linear income taxation that grew out of the original contribution of
Mirrlees (1971) has considered models where there is perfect substitution of labor inputs in the
production function and where the space choice for individual earnings is an interval instead of
a discrete set. Piketty (1997) and Saez (2000a) have shown that the discrete model leads to
16formulas of the same form as in the standard continuum case. Therefore, nothing fundamental
is changed by assuming a discrete set of earnings outcomes. In that context, the Tax Formula
shows immediately that, even if we relax the assumption that labor inputs are perfect substitutes,
the same optimal tax formulas apply. This shows that optimal income tax formulas and results
remain valid when the perfect substitution assumption is dropped in the context of the long-run
occupational choice model where the income tax amounts to imposing dierentiated tax rate on
each occupation.
It is important to understand that this is not contradictory with Stiglitz (1982) who shows
that relaxing the perfect substitution assumption alters optimal income tax formulas. Stiglitz
(1982) result is obtained in a model where individuals are either skilled or unskilled and vary
their labor supply within occupations. As a result and as explained above, the non-linear income
tax is not equivalent to dierentiated tax rates on labor inputs, and thus the Tax-Formula result
breaks down. The Mirrlees (1971) continuous model can be interpreted as an hours of work
model where skills are xed12 in which case optimal tax formulas are not robust to relaxing the
assumption of perfect substitution. But the Mirrlees (1971) model can also be interpreted as
an occupation choice model where individuals choose their occupation among a continuum. In
that case, the non-linear income tax is directly equivalent to dierentiated tax rates on each
occupation and thus the standard optimal tax formulas are still valid in the case of imperfect
substitution.13
 Complementary Commodity Taxation
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) showed in the context of the Mirrlees (1971) model of income
taxation with many consumption goods that in the presence of an optimal non-linear income
tax, commodity taxation is useless when utility is weakly separable between leisure and con-
sumption goods. Atkinson and Stiglitz proved their result in a xed price model (i.e. with
12That was the interpretation given originally in Mirrlees (1971)
13As there is a continuum of choices in the Mirrlees (1971) model, one would have to extend the Diamond-
Mirrlees model to the case with a continuum of factors. We conjecture that it is possible to do so rigorously
and describe regularity conditions that would make Propositions 1 and 2 true in that context. However, as the
mathematical degree of complication would be far greater, we think that the nite case provides an approximation
good enough and thus do not pursue the continuum case any further.
17perfect substitution of labor types in the production function). As shown by Naito (1999), the
Aktinson-Stiglitz theorem breaks down with imperfect substitution in the context of the hours
choice model. However, we are going to show that the theorem is robust in the occupational
choice model.
More precisely, the weak separability assumption takes the following form. Individual n has
a utility function of the form Un(v(c);i) where i = 0;::;I is the occupation choice, and v(c) is
the sub-utility of consumption goods.14 We can easily prove the following proposition,
Proposition 3 In the occupation choice model, the Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem remains valid
with imperfect substitution in labor types. Namely, weak separability implies that there no need
to tax commodities at the optimum.
Proof: The proof goes in two steps. First, we need to show that, assuming xed prices, the
Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem goes through in the discrete model we are considering. The easiest
way to see this is to use the proof method developed by Christiansen (1984).
Weak separability implies that the consumption choice vector can be written as c( q;m) where
 q is the vector price of goods and m is disposable income (equal to mi = wi   Ti in occupation
i). Let us denote by V ( q;m) = maxc v(c) s.t.  qc  m. Individual n then chooses i to maximize
semi-indirect utility function Un(V ( q;mi);i).
Starting from no commodity taxation and optimal income taxation, let us consider a small
increase dt1 in (say) t1. The proof consists in showing that the eects on tax revenue and welfare
of this change can be reproduced by a small income tax change such that dTi = c1( q;mi)dt1 for
each i = 0;::;I. The proof is sketched in appendix. As the income tax is optimal, the income
tax change, and hence the commodity tax change dt1 do not improve welfare, implying that no
commodity taxation is optimal.
Second, if we now assume that prices are variables, using Proposition 2, we can apply the
Tax-Formula result stating that the rst order conditions for optimality with variable prices
take the same form as when prices are xed. From step one, optimal tax formulas imply that
commodity tax rates are zero in the xed price model, therefore, commodity tax rates are also
zero with variable prices. Q.E.D.
14As discussed in Saez (2000b), the fact that the function v(:) is common to all individuals is often overlooked
but is as important as the weak separability assumption to obtain the Atkinson-Stiglitz result.
18 Caveat
As discussed in the beginning of this section, the key assumption needed to obtain Proposi-
tions 1, 2, and 3 is that each income level corresponds to a unique occupation. This assumption
is innocuous in the case of a discrete number of jobs. However, in the real world situation, there
is a very large number of sectors and occupations, and individuals earning the same income can
end up being in very dierent occupations. In that case, a general income tax cannot replicate
any pattern of specic taxes for each occupation type and the formal results of Propositions 1,
2, and 3 break down.
However, it is important to note that this lack of robustness is very dierent from the one
described in Stiglitz (1982) and Naito (1999). Indeed, the results of Stiglitz (1982) and Naito
(1999) are important, not only because they show that the normal theory is not robust, but
also and mostly because they give a clear sense of how policy should be tilted relative to the
normal theory. Namely, the analysis of Naito (1999), as discussed in Section 2.1, provided
an unambiguous justication for providing wage subsidies for industries employing low skilled
workers or imposing taris on low skilled intensive goods.
In the occupational model, the income tax cannot discriminate between occupations generat-
ing the same earnings. Therefore, in that case, occupation specic subsidies constitute a policy
instrument more powerful than the income tax. However, in contrast to Naito (1999) situation,
it is not clear whether these subsidies should be tilted toward low earnings occupations rather
than higher earnings ones. Therefore, introducing this additional layer of complication does not
provide any clear-cut policy recommendation as to what type of goods and industries should be
subsidized. As a result, this complication introduces a second order deviation from the set-up
we considered and the Propositions obtained in this paper are likely to be still an accurate
approximation to the optimal policy.
4 Conclusion
This paper has shown that, in a long-run context where individuals respond to tax incentives
through the occupation margin, the key results of optimal tax theory, namely production e-
ciency, the irrelevance of substitution in production for optimal tax formulas, and the Atkinson-
19Stiglitz theorem on commodity taxation, are robust to the relaxation of the assumption of xed
priced and perfect observability of labor types. This stands in contrast to a short-run situation
where individuals are stuck into their occupations and can only adjust labor supply on the job.
Stiglitz (1982) and Naito (1999) showed that, in that context, the results of optimal taxation
are not robust. The reason for the dierence is that, in the long-run, individuals move from
occupation to occupation depending on the after-tax rewards in each occupation, and therefore,
the (non-linear) income tax has the same eects as dierentiated tax rates on labor types.
These results have important tax policy implications: In a short-run perspective, indirect
tax instruments such as production subsidies on low skilled labor intensive sectors, taris or
commodity taxes on high skilled labor intensive goods, are desirable to complement the redis-
tribution achieved by progressive income taxation. However, In a long-run perspective, these
indirect tax instruments are sub-optimal and redistribution should be achieved solely with the
direct progressive income tax.
This set of prescriptions ts well with the real world economy. Unions support taris or
production subsidies because union members are stuck to occupations. Using redistributing
tools which lead to production ineciencies might then be a helpful way to manipulate wage
rates and improve redistribution. The short-run might indeed be one or two decades long which
is very long given the time horizon of nitely lived workers. As taris or production subsidies
can serve the general interest in the short-run (as opposed to mere particular interests), it is
rational that some political parties support these policies.15
On the other hand, in a long-run perspective, it would be unwise for the government to try
to save using large subsidies or taris production sectors that can no longer compete with newer
technologies or foreign production. Therefore, in the long run context, it makes sense for the
government to keep production ecient and let supply adjust to the new economic situation. In
other words, it cannot be optimal for a government to go against ecient technological advances
in the long-run. In this context, redistribution should take place, through a general income tax
and consumption taxes that do not lead to production ineciencies.
15Diamond (1982) develops a simple model where industries decline and workers face moving costs of switching
to another industry. In that situation, it might be optimal for the government to provide subsidies to moving
costs or to declining industries. The present analysis focuses on the long-run and thus ignores the moving cost
issue.
20The corporate income tax in the US provides a good example of this short-run versus long-
run contradiction. The corporate income tax leads to production ineciencies because dierent
sectors are treated dierently. It is believed that the corporate income tax treats dierently
sectors because some sectors successfully lobby to obtain tax preferences.16 In the short-run,
a government might nd it socially benecial to provide tax breaks in some sectors in order
to aect wages and enhance redistribution in a way the income tax cannot. However, in the
long-run, these ineciencies cannot be optimal and tax preferences are cleared from time to
time through a general corporate income tax reform (as happened for example in the U.S. with
the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
It is therefore important to assess which of the two models (short-run versus long-run) ts
the best with the real situation. As we discussed, these two models could be distinguished by
the empirical analysis of labor supply responses. This literature gives clear evidence that the
occupation choice margin is sensitive in the long-run to rewards, while the evidence on responses
to incentives within occupations appears to be weaker. A sharper test would be to test directly
whether a low wage subsidy has negative incentive eects for (slightly) higher wage earners. The
short-run model predicts it should not while the long run model predicts it should have exactly
the same eects as a corresponding cut in the income tax for low wage earners. This important
empirical question is left for future research.
16See for example Boskin (1996) for an exposition of this view.
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 Proof of Lemma 1
The regularity of X(q) follows from Lebesgue's Dominated Convergence Theorem. Let q >>
0 and qj be a sequence converging to q. By the regularity assumption on utility functions, xn(:)
is continuous at q when the individual n is not indierent between two or more job choices
when facing price q. By assumption, this is true except for a set of measure zero. Therefore,
xn(qj) ! xn(q) when j ! 1 almost surely. For q >> 0, it is clear that the demand functions
xn(q) are bounded. Thus, by the theorem of dominated convergence, X(qj) ! X(q), implying
that X(q) is continuous. The proof of the continuity of V (q) is even simpler because the
individual V n(q) functions are continuous.
The proof of the dierentiability of X(q) (and V (q)) proceeds in the same way. Q.E.D.
 Proof of the Atkinson-Stiglitz result in the discrete model
As mentioned in the text, we have to show that the income tax change such that dTi =
c1( q;mi)dt1 for each i = 0;::;I has the same eect on tax revenue and welfare as the commodity
tax change dt1. Note that the change dTi is well dened because the function c1( q;mi) is
the same for all individuals. That is why the weak separability (and uniform sub-utility v(c))
assumption is key to the result.
First, from Roy's identity, we have Vt1 =  Vmc1, thus both changes have the same eect on
individual utility and hence on welfare. Second, because both changes have the same eect on
the sub-utility V ( q;m), any individual who switches occupations because of one the tax change
also switches occupations because of the other one (and vice-versa). Therefore, the behavioral
responses to the two tax changes are identical. Thus the eect on tax revenue due to behavioral
responses is the same in both cases. Last, the mechanical change in tax revenue is the same in
both cases and equal to dt1
P
i fic1( q;mi). Therefore, the small commodity tax is fully equivalent
to the small income tax change.
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